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Abstract
In this paper we investigate the issues concerning the use of a single server across a network,
the key distribution center (KDC) to enable private communications within groups of users.
After providing several motivations, showing the advantages related to the distribution of the task
accomplished by this server, we describe a model for such a distribution, and present bounds on
the amount of resources required in a real-world implementation: random bits, memory storage,
and messages to be exchanged. Moreover, we introduce a linear algebraic approach to design
optimal schemes distributing a KDC, and we point out that some previous constructions belong
to the proposed framework.
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1. Introduction
Private communications over insecure channels can be carried out using encryption
algorithms. If a public key infrastructure is available, public key algorithms can be
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employed. However, in this setting, if a user wishes to send the same message to n
diCerent users, he has to compute n encryptions of the message using n diCerent public
keys, and he has to send the message to each of them. Moreover, public key encryption
and decryption are slow operations and, when the communication involves a group of
users, hereafter referred to as a conference, this communication strategy is completely
ineDcient from a computational and communication points of view.
An improvement on the “trivial” use of public key algorithms can be the hybrid
approach: a user chooses at random a key and sends it, in encrypted form (public
key), to all the other members of the conference. Then, they can privately communicate
using a symmetric algorithm. Indeed, symmetric encryption algorithms are a few orders
of magnitude more eDcient than public key ones. Triple-DES, RC6, and AES, for
example, are fast algorithms, widely used, and supposed to be secure. Besides, if a
broadcast channel is available, a message for diCerent recipients needs to be sent just
once. Hence, better performance can be achieved with symmetric algorithms. However,
the hybrid protocol described before is still not eDcient, and it is possible to make
better: the number of keys each user has to store, and the number of messages required
to establish a conference key, can be reduced. Actually, the question is how we can
set up an e:cient protocol to provide a common key to each conference.
A common solution is the use of a key distribution center (KDC, for short), a
server responsible for the distribution and management of the secret keys. The idea
is the following: each user shares a common key with the centre. When he wants to
securely communicate with other users, he sends a request for a conference key. The
center checks for membership of the user in that conference, and distributes in encrypted
form the conference key to each member of the group. Needham and Schroeder [32]
began this approach, implemented most notably in the Kerberos System [33], and
formally de<ned and studied in [3], where it is referred to as the three-party model.
The scheme implemented by the KDC to give each conference a key is called a KDS.
The scheme is said to be unconditionally secure if its security is independent of the
computational resources of the adversaries.
Several kinds of key distribution schemes have been considered so far: key pre-
distribution schemes (KPSs), key agreement schemes (KASs) and broadcast encryption
schemes (BESs) among others. The notions of KPS and KAS are very close to each
other [6,10,29]. BESs are designed to enable secure broadcast transmissions and have
been introduced in [22]. The broadcast encryption idea has grown in various directions:
traitor tracing [17], anonymous broadcast transmission [26], re-keying protocols for
secure multi-cast communications [14,15,35]. Our attention in this paper focusses on a
model improving upon the weaknesses of a single KDC. Indeed, in the network model
outlined before, a KDC must be trusted; moreover, it could become a communication
bottleneck since all key request messages are sent to it and, last but not least, it could
become a point of failure for the system: if the server crashes, secure communications
cannot be supported anymore.
In [31] a new approach to key distribution was introduced to solve the above prob-
lems. A distributed key distribution center (DKDC, for short) is a set of n servers of
a network that jointly realises the same function of a key distribution center. A user
who needs to participate in a conference, sends a key-request to a subset of his own
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choosing of the n servers. The contacted servers answer with some information en-
abling the user to compute the conference key. In such a model, a single server by
itself does not know the secret keys, since they are shared between the n servers, the
communication bottleneck is eliminated, since the key-request messages are distributed,
on average, along diCerent paths, and there is no single point of failure, since if a server
crashes, then the other servers are still able to support conference key computation. In
subsequent papers [7,20], the notion of DKDC has been studied from an information
theoretic point of view. Therein, the authors introduced the concept of a distributed key
distribution scheme (DKDS), a scheme realising a DKDC, showing that the protocol
proposed in [31], based on ‘-wise independent functions, is optimal with respect to the
amount of information needed to set up and manage the system. A threshold access
structure was considered on the set of servers, that is, the subsets of servers authorised
to help the users in recovering the conference keys were determined in terms of their
cardinality. Lower bounds on the required resources were shown by applying directly
equalities and inequalities from Information Theory. In this paper, we extend the model
studied in [7,20] by considering a general access structure on the set of servers, that
is, we consider an arbitrary family of quali<ed subsets of servers. In order to recover
a conference key, a user has to contact all servers in any authorised subset of servers
from the access structure.
We present bounds holding on the model using a reduction technique which relates
DKDSs to Secret Sharing Schemes [5,36]. This technique enables us to prove lower
bounds on the memory storage, on the communication complexity and randomness
needed to set up the scheme in an easy and elegant way. Moreover, we describe a
linear algebraic approach to design DKDS using a linear secret-sharing scheme and a
family of linear ‘-wise independent forms. The optimality of the obtained constructions
relies on the optimality of the secret-sharing scheme used as building block. Finally,
we emphasise the suitability of this approach that allows a uni<ed description of seem-
ingly diCerent schemes, pointing out that some previous constructions can be seen as
instances of the proposed framework.
Organisation of the paper: A short overview of secret-sharing schemes is given in
Section 2, where basic de<nitions and results are recalled. A model for distributed key
distribution schemes and the notation we use in the paper are given in Section 3. Some
lower bounds on the amount of information stored by the servers and sent to reply to
the key-request messages, and on the number of random bits required to set up the
scheme are given in Section 4. In Sections 5 a linear algebraic method to construct
DKDSs from any linear secret-sharing scheme is described, and some examples are
presented in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 is devoted to conclusions and some open
problems.
2. Secret sharing schemes
A secret-sharing scheme is a method by means of which a secret can be shared
among a set P of n participants in such a way that quali<ed subsets of P can recover
the secret, but any non-quali<ed subset has absolutely no information. Secret-sharing
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were introduced in 1979 by Blakley [5] and Shamir [36]. The reader can <nd an
excellent introduction in [39]. The collection of subsets of participants quali<ed to
reconstruct the secret is usually referred to as the access structure of the secret-sharing-
scheme. A special type of access structures is given by the so-called monotone access
structures. Formally, we have
Denition 2.1. Let P be a set of participants, a monotone access structure A on P
is a subset A⊆ 2P\{∅}, such that
A ∈A; A ⊆ A′ ⊆ P⇒ A′ ∈A:
Since, as we will see later, the reconstruction property of a secret-sharing scheme
naturally induces the monotonicity property, then all access structures we are going to
consider are monotone.
Let us denote by K(P) the set of all possible shares given to participant P, for any
participant P ∈P. Suppose a dealer D wishes to share the secret s∈ S among the par-
ticipants in P (we shall assume that D =∈P). To this aim, he gives to each participant
P ∈P a share from K(P), chosen according to some (non-necessarily uniform) proba-
bility distribution. Given a set of participants A= {Pi1 ; : : : ; Pir}⊆P, where i1¡ · · ·¡ir ,
denote by K(A)=K(Pi1 )× · · ·×K(Pir ). Any secret-sharing scheme for secrets in S
and a probability distribution {pS(s)}s∈S naturally induce a probability distribution on
K(A), for any A⊆P. Denote such probability distribution by {pK(A)(a)}a∈K(A). To
avoid overburdening the notation, with the same symbol A, we will denote both a sub-
set of participants and the random variable assuming values in K(A) according to the
probability distribution {pK(A)(a)}a∈K(A); analogously, with S we will denote both the
set of secrets and the random variable assuming values in S according to {pS(s)}s∈S .
For any s∈ S and a∈K(A) with pK(A)(a)¿0 denote, p(s | a) by the probability that
the secret is equal to s given that the shares held by participants in A are equal to
a. In terms of Shannon’s entropy, 1 we say that a secret-sharing scheme is a perfect
secret-sharing scheme with secrets chosen in S, or simply a secret-sharing scheme with
secrets chosen in S, for the monotone access structure A⊆ 2P if
1. Any subset A⊆P of participants enabled to recover the secret can compute the
secret:
Formally, for all A∈A, it holds that H (S |A)= 0.
2. Any subset A⊆P of participants not enabled to recover the secret has no infor-
mation on the secret value:
Formally, for all A =∈A, it holds that H (S |A)=H (S).
Property 1 means that the values of the shares held by A∈A completely determine the
secret s∈ S. On the other hand, Property 2 means that the probability that the secret
is equal to s, given that the shares held by A =∈A are equal to a, is the same as the
a priori probability of the secret s.
The eDciency of a secret-sharing scheme is measured by means of an “information
rate”, which relates the size of the secret with the size of the shares given to the
1 The reader is referred to Appendix A for the de<nition of the entropy function and some basic properties.
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participants. More precisely, given a secret-sharing scheme  for the access structure
A, on the set of secrets S, we de<ne the information rate (;A; S) as
(;A; S) =
log |S|
maxP∈P log |K(P)|
and the optimal information rate of A as
(A) = sup (;A; S);
where the supremum is taken over the space of all possible sets of secrets S, such that
|S|¿2, and all secret-sharing schemes for A. Secret-sharing schemes with information
rate equal to one, which is the maximum possible value of this parameter, are called
ideal, and an access structure A on S is said to be ideal if there exists an ideal
secret-sharing scheme  realising it.
Secret-sharing schemes have been extensively studied, and a huge amount of re-
sults can be found in the literature (see [42]). One of the basic issues in the area of
secret-sharing schemes is that of estimating the information rate of the scheme, that
is, the ratio between the size of the secret and that of the largest share given to any
participant. This problem has received considerable attention in the last few years (e.g.,
[2,8,9,13,16,19,21,34,40]). The practical relevance of this issue is based on the follow-
ing observations: <rstly, the security of any system tends to degrade as the amount of
information that must be kept secret, i.e. the shares of the participants, increases. Sec-
ondly, if the shares given to participants are too long, then the memory requirements
for the participants will be too severe and, at the same time, the share distribution al-
gorithms will become ineDcient. Therefore, it is important to derive signi<cative upper
and lower bounds on the information rate of secret-sharing schemes.
A special class of secret-sharing schemes, on which our constructions of DKDSs
will be based on, is the class of linear secret-sharing schemes (LSSS, for short). We
brieNy recall some basic facts. Let E be a vector space of <nite dimension over a <nite
<eld GF(q). For every Pi ∈P∪{D=P0}, let Ei be a vector space over GF(q), and let
i : E→Ei be a surjective linear mapping. Let us suppose that these linear mappings
satisfy the following properties: for any A⊂P, either⋂
Pi∈A
ker i ⊂ ker 0 or
⋂
Pi∈A
ker i + ker 0 = E:
The family of vector spaces and the linear surjective mappings de<ned above determine
the following access structure
A =
{
A ⊂ P : ⋂
Pi∈A
ker i ⊂ ker 0
}
:
A linear secret-sharing scheme with secrets chosen in E0 for the access structure
A can be de<ned as follows: for a secret k∈E0 (hereinafter, vectors will be noted
in bold type), the dealer chooses randomly and uniformly a vector v∈E such that
0(v)= k and sends to each participant Pi ∈P the vector ai = i(v)∈Ei as its share.
A formal proof that this is a secret-sharing scheme for the access structure A with
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secrets chosen in E0 can be derived by a straightforward application of the following
lemma.
Lemma 2.2. Let E, E0 and E1 be vector spaces over a =nite =eld GF(q). Let us
consider two linear mappings ’0 : E→E0 and ’1 : E→E1, where ’0 is surjective. Let
us suppose that a vector x∈E is chosen uniformly at random and let us consider the
random variables X0 and X1 corresponding to x0 =’0(x) and x1 =’1(x), respectively.
Then,
1. H (X0 |X1)= 0 if and only if ker ’1⊂ ker ’0,
2. H (X0 |X1)=H (X0) if and only if ker ’1 + ker ’0 =E.
Proof. Let y be a solution to the linear system ’1(y)= x1 =’1(x). Then, z= x −
y∈ ker ’1. This implies that
X0 = ’0(x) = ’0(y) + ’0(z); where z ∈ ker ’1: (1)
Moreover, z may be, with uniform probability, any vector in ker ’1.
Let us prove now the <rst part of the lemma. If ker ’1⊂ ker ’0, then, by (1), we get
x0 =’0(y) and, hence, H (X0 |X1)= 0. On the contrary, if ker ’1 ⊂ ker ’0, then there
is a positive probability that z =∈ ker ’0 and, therefore, x0 is not determined by x1, that
is, H (X0 |X1)¿0.
Finally, we prove the second part of the lemma. To do so, we prove before that
ker ’0 + ker ’1 = E if and only if ’0(ker ’1) = E0:
Indeed, if ’0(ker ’1)=E0, then, for any x∈E, there exists y∈ ker ’1 such that ’0(x)=
’0(y). Therefore, we can write x as x= y+(x−y), where y∈ ker ’1 and x−y∈ ker ’0.
Reciprocally, if ker ’1+ker ’0 =E, then E0 =’0(E)=’0(ker ’1+ker ’0)=’0(ker ’1).
Now, because of (1), if ’0(ker ’1)=E0, then z may be any vector in ker ’1, which im-
plies that X0 may be any vector in E0 with uniform probability. Therefore, H (X0 |X1)=
H (X0). If, on the other hand, ’0(ker ’1) is a proper subspace of E0, then (1) restricts
all possible values of x0 to a vector space whose dimension is smaller than that of E0,
namely, H (X0 |X1)¡H (X0).
Notice that the above result, applied to our linear algebraic framework, says that the
sets in A whose linear mappings satisfy the condition
⋂
Pi∈A ker i⊂ ker 0 are sets
allowed to recover the secret. On the contrary, the ones whose mappings satisfy the
condition
⋂
Pi∈A ker i + ker 0 =E obtain no information on the secret.
The information rate of this scheme is = dim E0=(max16i6n dim Ei). In an LSSS
the secret is computed by a linear mapping. More precisely, for every A= {Pi1 ; : : : ; Pir}
∈A, there exists a linear mapping A : Ei1 × · · ·×Eir →E0 that enables the participants
in A to compute the secret.
Linear secret-sharing schemes were <rst introduced by Brickell [12], who consid-
ered only ideal linear schemes with dim Ei =1 for any Pi ∈P∪{D}. General linear
secret-sharing schemes were introduced by Simmons [37], Jackson and Martin [24]
and Karchmer and Wigderson [27] under other names such as geometric secret-sharing
schemes or monotone span programs.
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3. The model
Let U= {U1; : : : ; Um} be a set of m users and let S= {S1; : : : ; Sn} be a set of n
servers. Each user has private connections with all the servers. Let us consider an
access structure A⊂ 2S on the set of servers and two families C;G⊂ 2U of subsets
of the set of users. C is the family of conferences, i.e. the family of groups of users
who want to securely communicate, and G is the family of adversarial coalitions,
i.e. the family of coalitions of users who can try to break the scheme in some way.
A DKDS is divided in three phases: an initialisation phase, which involves only the
servers; a key-request phase, in which users ask the servers for (shares of) confer-
ence keys; and a key-computation phase, in which users reconstruct conference keys
from the messages that they received from the servers contacted during the key-request
phase.
Initialisation phase: We assume that the initialisation phase is performed by a priv-
ileged subset of servers PI = {S1; : : : ; St}∈A. Each of these servers, using a private
source of randomness ri, generates some information that securely distributes to the
others. More precisely, for i=1; : : : ; t, Si sends to Sj the value !i; j, where j=1; : : : ; n.
At the end of the distribution, for i=1; : : : ; n; each server Si computes and stores some
secret information ai =f(!1; i ; : : : ; !t; i); where f is a publicly known function.
Key-request phase: Let Ch ∈C be a conference. Each user Uj in Ch, contacts the
servers belonging to some subset P ∈A, requiring a key for the conference Ch. We
denote such a key by %h. Server Si ∈P, contacted by user Uj, checks 2 for membership
of Uj in Ch; if Uj ∈Ch, then Si computes a value yhi; j =F(ai; j; h), where F is a
public known function. Otherwise, Si sets yhi; j = ⊥, a special value which conveys no
information about %h. Finally, Si sends the value yhi; j to Uj.
Key-computation phase: Once having received the answers from the contacted
servers, each user Uj in Ch computes %h=GP(yhi1 ; j ; : : : ; y
h
i|P| ; j), where i1; : : : ; i|P| are
the indices of the contacted servers, and GP is a publicly known function.
We are interested in formalising, within an information theoretic framework, the
notion of a DKDS, in order to quantify exactly the amount of resources that a real-
world implementation of such a system can require. We use the entropy function
because it enables a compact, elegant, and concise description of the model, and it
permits to take into account all possible probability distributions on the entities of the
system. To this aim, we need to setup our notation.
• Let C⊂ 2U be the set of conferences on U indexed by elements of H= {1; 2; : : :}.
• For any subset G= {Uj1 ; : : : ; Ujg}⊂U of users, denote by CG = {Ch ∈C : Ch ∩G =
∅} the set of conferences containing some user in G, and byHG = {h∈H :Ch ∈CG}
the set of corresponding indices. Let ‘= maxG∈G |CG| be the maximum number of
conferences that are controlled by any coalition in G.
• For i=1; : : : ; t, let (i; j be the set of values !i; j that can be sent by server Si to
server Sj, for j=1; : : : ; n, and let (j =(1; j × · · ·×(t; j be the set of tuples that Sj;
for j=1; : : : ; n; can receive during the initialisation phase.
2 We do not consider the underlying authentication mechanism involved in a key request phase.
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Table 1
Cartesian products
(Y set of tuples that can be received by server Sj , for j∈ Y
(X; j set of tuples that can be sent by server Si to Sj , for i∈X
(X; Y set of tuples that can be sent by server Si to Sj , for i∈X and j∈ Y
KX set of tuples of conference keys
AX set of tuples of private information ai
Y hX; j set of tuples that can be sent by Si , for i∈X , to Uj for the conference Ch
Y hG set of tuples that can be sent by S1; : : : ; Sn to Uj , with j∈G, for Ch
YHG set of tuples that, for any h∈H , can be sent by S1; : : : ; Sn to Uj , with j∈G, for Ch
• Let Kh be the set of possible values for the key %h, and let Ai be the set of values
ai the server Si can compute during the initialisation phase.
• Finally, let Y hi; j be the set of values yhi; j that can be sent by Si when it receives a
key-request message from Uj for the conference Ch.
Given three sets of indices X = {i1; : : : ; ir}, where i1¡i2 · · ·¡ir , Y = {j1; : : : ; js},
where j1¡j2 · · ·¡js, and H = {h1; : : : ; ht}, where h1¡h2 · · ·¡ht , and three families
of sets {Ti}, {Ti; j} and {Thi; j}, we denote by TX =
∏
i∈X Ti, by TX;Y =
∏
i∈X; j∈Y Ti; j,
and by THX;Y =
∏
i∈X; j∈Y; h∈H T
h
i; j, the corresponding Cartesian products. According to
this notation, we will consider several Cartesian products, de<ned on the sets of our
interest (see Table 1).
We will denote in boldface the random variables $i; j ;$j; : : : ;YXG assuming values in
the sets (i; j; (j; : : : ; Y XG , according to the probability distributions P$i; j ;P$j ; : : : ;PYXG .
Roughly speaking, a DKDC must satisfy the following properties:
• Correct initialisation phase: When the initialisation phase correctly terminates, each
server Si must be able to compute his private information ai. On the other hand, if
server Si misses/does not receive just one message from the servers in PI sending
information, 3 then Si must not gain any information about ai. We model these two
properties by relations 1 and 2 of the formal de<nition.
• Consistent key computation: Each user in a conference Ch⊆U must be able to
compute the same conference key, after interacting with the servers of a subset
P ∈A at his choice. Relations 3 and 4 of the formal de<nition ensure these prop-
erties. More precisely, relation 3 establishes that each server uniquely determines
an answer to any key-request message; while, property 4 establishes that each user
uniquely computes the same conference key, using the messages received by the
subset of authorised servers he has contacted for that conference key.
3 Without loss of generality, we choose PI as one of the smallest subsets in A because one of our aims
is to minimise the randomness (i.e., the number of random bits needed to set up the scheme) and the
communication complexity of the initialisation phase. Of course, other choices are possible as well. Also a
single server could perform the initialisation but, in such a way, we re-introduce concentration of secrets
in a single point (even if temporarily). In general, the use of a subset of servers smaller than one of the
smallest subsets in A decreases the security of the overall system.
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• Conference key security: A conference key must be secure against attacks performed
by coalitions of servers, coalitions of users, and hybrid coalitions (servers and users).
This is the most intriguing and diDcult property to formalise. Indeed, the worst case
scenario to look after consists of a coalition of users G ∈G that honestly run the
protocol many times, retrieving several conference keys and, then, with the cooper-
ation of some dishonest servers, try to gain information on a new conference key,
which was not requested before. Notice that, according to our notation, the maxi-
mum amount of information the coalition can acquire honestly running the protocol
is represented by YHGG ; moreover, dishonest servers, belonging to F =∈A, know $F
and, may be, $Z;N , where Z =F ∩PI and N = {1; : : : ; n}. This random variable takes
into account the possibility that some of the dishonest servers send information in
the initialisation phase. Hence, they know the messages they send out to the other
servers in this phase. Relation 5 ensures that such coalitions of adversaries, do not
gain information on any new key.
Formally, a DKDS with access structure A on S can be de<ned as follows:
Denition 3.1. Let U= {U1; : : : ; Um} be a set of users and let S= {S1; : : : ; Sn} be
a set of servers. Let us consider an access structure A⊂ 2S on the set of servers
and two families C;G⊂ 2U of subsets of the set of users. An (A;C;G)-DKDS (for
short, (A;C;G)-DKDS) is a protocol which enables each user of Ch ∈C to compute
a common key %h interacting with a subset of authorised servers in A of the network.
More precisely, the following properties are satis<ed:
1. For each i=1; : : : ; n, H (Ai |$i)= 0.
2. For each X ⊂PI , X =PI , and i∈{1; : : : ; n}, H (Ai |$X;i)=H (Ai).
3. For each Ch ∈C, for each Uj ∈Ch, and for each i=1; : : : ; n, H (Yhi; j |Ai)= 0.
4. For each Ch ∈C, for each P ∈A, and for each Uj ∈Ch, H (Kh |YhP; j)= 0.
5. For each Ch ∈C, for each G ∈G, and for each subset F =∈A
H (Kh |YHGG ;$F ;$Z;N ) = H (Kh);
where h =∈HG, Z =F ∩PI ; and N = {1; : : : ; n}.
Notice that a DKDC implementing a DKDS is a deterministic system. Random bits
are needed only at the beginning (i.e. initialisation of the system), when each server
in PI uses his own random source to generate messages to be delivered to the other
servers of the network.
In our model a user, once computed key %h for conference Ch, stores it in his own
local memory. In other words, the model does not deal with session keys, i.e., keys
that can be used only for a short time-period. Every key %h can be seen as a long-
term key that the conference might use as a seed for generating short-term session
keys, by means of some computationally secure session-key generator. Applying such
a strategy implies that the overall security of the communication mechanism (key
establishment plus symmetric algorithms for encrypting and authenticating messages)
is computational; however, the use of an unconditionally secure distribution scheme
for the long-term keys enables relaxing the security requirements on the generator that
each user runs in order to compute the current session key. Indeed, if computationally
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secure key establishment methods are used, partial information about the established
key might be available to an adversary. Hence, usually a key derivation function is
applied by the parties to the established common key in order to generate a session
key in which, in a certain sense, such a leakage has been removed (see Chapter 12
of [30] for details). On the other hand, if the long-term established key is perfectly
secure, then such a requirement can be relaxed.
4. Communication complexity, memory storage, and randomness of a DKDS
A basic relation between (A;C;G)-DKDS and secret sharing schemes enables us to
derive some lower bounds on the memory storage, on the communication complexity,
and on the number of random bits needed to set up the scheme.
In the following, without loss of generality and to emphasise the real-world oriented
motivations of our study, we assume that the conference keys are uniformly chosen in
a set K . Hence, for diCerent h; h′ ∈H, H (Kh)=H (Kh′)= log |K |.
4.1. Preliminaries
We state some results that will be useful in proving the lower bounds.
The next lemma establishes that the amount of information a subset of servers gains
about the conference keys depends on the membership of the subset in the access
structure A, and it is all-or-nothing in fashion.
Lemma 4.1. Let P and F be two subsets of S such that P ∈A and F =∈A. Moreover,
let Hr = {h1 : : : ; hr}⊆H be a subset of indices of conferences. Then, it holds that
H (KHr |AP) = 0 and H (KHr |AF) = H (KHr ):
Proof. Let G= {Uj1 ; : : : ; Ujg} be a set of users, such that Hr ⊆HG. Notice that,
06H (KHr |AP) (from (3) of Appendix A)
6H (KHr |YHrP;G) (from Lemma A:1)
6
r∑
j=1
H (Khj |YhjP;G) (from (8) of Appendix A)
6
r∑
j=1
H (Khj |YhjP; t) (from (5) of Appendix A where t ∈ Chj ∩ G)
= 0 (from Property 4 of De<nition 3:1):
The second equality can be shown in a similar way. Indeed, from Property 1 of De<ni-
tion 3.1 and (A.9) of Appendix A, it holds that H (AF |$F)= 0; while, from Property 4
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of De<nition 3.1 and since Hr ⊆HG; it results, H (KHr\{hj}) |YHr\{hj}G =0. Applying
(A.9) of Appendix A, we get
H (K{hj} |AF ;KHr\{hj})¿ H (Khj |$F ;$Z;N ;YHr\{hj}G ): (2)
Hence, a simple algebra shows that
H (KHr )¿H (KHr |AF) (using (5) of Appendix A)
= H (Kh1 |AF) + H (Kh2 |Kh1 ;AF) + · · ·+ H (Khr |Kh1 ; : : : ;Khr ;AF)
(from (4) of Appendix A)
¿
r∑
j=1
H (Khj |AF ;KHr\{hj}) (from (3) of Appendix A)
¿
r∑
j=1
H (Khj |$F ;$Z;N ;YHr\{hj}G ) (from (2))
=
r∑
j=1
H (Khj)¿ H (KHr ) (applying Property 5 of De<nition 3:1
and (6) of Appendix A):
Thus, the lemma holds.
Finally, the conference keys a coalition of users can retrieve are statistically inde-
pendent.
Lemma 4.2. Let G= {Uj1 ; : : : ; Ujg}⊆G be a coalition of users, and let HG = {h1; : : : ;
h‘G}. Then, for each r=1; : : : ; ‘G, it holds that
H (Khr |KHG\{hr}) = H (Khr ):
Proof. From property (A.5) of Appendix A, one has H (Khr |KHG\{hr})6H (Khr), for
each r=1; : : : ; ‘G. Moreover, noticing that from property (A.5) of Appendix A
H (KHG\{hr} |YHG\{hr}G )6
∑
h∈HG\{hr}
H (Kh |YhG) = 0;
and setting A=Khr , B=KHG\{hr}, and C=Y
HG\{hr}
G , we can write
H (Khr |KHG\{hr})¿H (Khr |YHG\{hr}G ) (from Lemma A:1)
¿H (Khr |YGnHG\{hr};$F ;$Z;N ) (from (5) of Appendix A)
= H (Khr ) (from Property 5 of De<nition 3:1);
where N = {1; : : : ; n}, F = {i1; : : : ; ik−1}⊂N , and Z =F ∩{1; : : : ; t}. Hence, the ‘G con-
ference keys that the users in G can retrieve are independent.
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4.2. Lower bounds
Lower bounds on the amount of information each server has to store and send to a
key-request message, and on the number of random bits needed to set up the scheme
can be established exploring the relation existing between a DKDS and SSSs. Since
from Appendix A follows that H (X)6 log (|X |), for each random variable X assuming
values on the set X , we enunciate the lower bounds in terms of the size of the sets of
our interest.
First, notice that, the 4th and the 5th properties of De<nition 3.1 “contain” an SSS.
The <rst property is exactly the reconstruction property of an SSS, say 1, with access
structure A and set of secrets Kh. The second property contains the security condition
of 1. Indeed, it says that
• for each Ch ∈C, for each coalition G ∈G, and for each F =∈A it holds that
H (Kh |YHGG ;$F ;$Z;N ) = H (Kh):
Since the values yhi; j are a function of the private information ai, computed and stored
by each server at the end of the initialisation phase, it is easy to check that
H (Kh) = H (Kh |YHGG ;$F ;$Z;N ) (from Property 5 of the De<nition 3:1)
6H (Kh |AF) (from (5); Lemma A:1 of Appendix A;
and Property 1 of the De<nition 3:1)
6H (Kh |YhF;j)6 H (Kh):
Therefore, recalling that (A)= sup (;A; S), and assuming that for any h∈H
it holds that Kh=K , the size in bits each answer a server sends to reply to a key
request message must satisfy the inequality given by the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3 (Lower bound on key-request transmission). In any (A;C;G)-DKDS,
for all j=1; : : : ; m and for each h∈H, it holds that
max
i=1;:::;n
log (|Y hi;j|)¿
log (|K |)
(A)
:
Analogously, we can show a lower bound on the amount of information each server
has to store. To this aim, notice that each server basically holds a share of the sequence
of keys the users can ask for. According to the de<nition of a DKDS, the number of
conference keys the scheme provides is |C| but, as stated by Lemma 4.2, only ‘ of
them must be independent, where ‘ is the maximum number of conference keys that
a coalition G can retrieve. In order to derive the lower bound, we can assume that the
scheme enables to compute only ‘ conference keys, where ‘ is the maximum number
of conference keys a coalition of users G can retrieve. In this case, the secret the
servers share can be seen as an element belonging to the set T =KHG , for some G
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such that ‘G= ‘. Applying Lemma 4.2 and (A.6) of Appendix A (the equality case)
we can say that
H (T) = H (KH‘) =
∑
j
H (Kij) = ‘H (K):
Since Lemma 4.1 establishes that H (T |AP)= 0 if P ∈A, while H (T |AF)=H (T),
when F =∈A, we recover another SSS, say 2, with access structure A, and set of
secrets T . Consequently, the next theorem holds:
Theorem 4.4 (Lower bound on storage per server). In any (A;C;G)-DKDS, it holds
that
max log (|Ai|)¿ log (|T |)(A) ¿ ‘
log (|K |)
(A)
:
The communication complexity of an (A;C;G)-DKDS can be lower bounded as
follows: notice that properties 1 and 2 of a DKDS are again the properties characterising
a secret-sharing scheme, say 3. More precisely, for all X ⊂PI ; X =PI , it holds that
H (Ai |$i) = 0; while H (Ai |$F;i) = H (Ai)
for all i=1; : : : ; n. In this case S= {S1; : : : ; St} is the only subset in the access structure
A of the SSS 3 (i.e. a (t; t) threshold structure), and the shared secret is exactly ai.
Hence, the following holds:
Theorem 4.5 (Lower bound on set-up transmission—sender side). In any (A;C;G)-
DKDS, for j=1; : : : ; t, it holds
log (|(j;i|)¿ log (|Ai|):
Moreover, since each server performing the initialisation phase uses a private source
of random bits, we have:
Theorem 4.6 (Lower bound on set-up transmission—receiver side). In any (A;C;G)-
DKDS, it holds
log (|(j|) = log (|(1;j|)× · · · × log (|(t;j|) =
t∑
i=1
log (|(i;j|):
To set up a cryptographic protocol and in this case a DKDS, we need random bits.
This resource is usually referred to as the randomness of the scheme. 4
The randomness of a scheme can be measured in diCerent ways. Knuth and Yao
[28] proposed the following approach: let Alg be an algorithm that generates the
probability distribution P= {p1; : : : ; pn}, using only independent and unbiased ran-
dom bits. Denote by T (Alg) the average number of random bits used by Alg and let
4 A detailed analysis of the randomness in distribution protocols can be found in [11].
282 C. Blundo et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 320 (2004) 269–291
T (P)= minAlg T (Alg). The value T (P) is a measure of the average number of random
bits needed to simulate the random source described by the probability distribution P.
The randomness R, i.e. the required random bits for setting-up the DKDC, can be
lowerbounded as stated by the following theorem.
Theorem 4.7 (Lower bound on the randomness needed in set-up phase). In any (A;
C;G)-DKDS the randomness satis=es
R¿ t × ‘ × Ropt ;
where t= |PI |, ‘ is the maximum number of conference keys that a coalition of
adversaries can retrieve, and Ropt is the minimum amount of randomness required
to generate and share a secret according to a secret-sharing scheme  with access
structure A. Ropt depends both on the size of the required key %h and on the access
structure.
Indeed, applying a similar argument to the one we have applied before in order to
derive the lower bound on the size of the private information stored by each server,
we can say that the scheme enables to compute at least ‘ conference keys. Since
Lemma 4.2 implies that these ‘ conference keys are independent, the share held by
each server can be seen as a sequence of ‘ independent sub-shares, one for each
conference key. Therefore, the randomness needed to set up the scheme is at least the
randomness needed to share independently ‘ keys among the servers, according to the
given access structure. The bound follows observing that each of the t servers setting
up the system performs an independent sharing of ‘ values from which the keys are
derived.
Hence, all the results and bounds on SSS concerning randomness and information
rates related to the study of speci<c access structures can be used to retrieve corre-
sponding results and bounds holding for (A;C;G)-DKDSs.
5. Protocols: Designing DKDSs from LSSSs
In this section, we present a method to construct an (A;C;G)-DKDS given a general
access structure A on the set of servers S. We start by recalling some preliminary
concepts.
Let E; E0; E1; : : : ; En be vector spaces of <nite dimension over a <nite <eld GF(q)
and, for i=0; : : : ; n, let i :E→Ei be surjective linear mappings de<ning an LSSS
 with access structure A whose participants are the servers in S. For any autho-
rised subset A= {Si1 ; : : : ; Sir}∈A, let A be the linear mapping A :Ei1 × · · ·×Eir →E0
enabling the reconstruction of the secret from the shares. Moreover, from every i, let
‘i :E
‘→E‘i be a mapping de<ned as ‘i (u1; : : : ; u‘)= (i(u1); : : : ; i(u‘)). It is not dif-
<cult to see that the mappings ‘i de<ne an LSSS 
‘ with secrets chosen in E‘0 on the
same access structure and with the same information rate of . In this case, the secret
is reconstructed from the shares by using the linear mappings ‘A :E
‘
i1 × · · ·×E‘ir →E‘0
de<ned from A.
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Then, let us consider, for h=1; : : : ; |C|, a sequence of linear forms ’h :GF(q)‘→
GF(q), such that any ‘ diCerent forms ’h1 ; : : : ; ’h‘ are linearly independent.
Notice that a form ’h can be seen as a vector in the dual space (GF(q)‘)∗ and
it is determined by its coordinates (1h;1; : : : ; 1h; ‘), where ’h(v1; : : : ; v‘)=
∑‘
j=1 1h; jvj.
Therefore, if q¿|C|, such a family of linear forms can be constructed by consider-
ing |C| diCerent values z1; : : : ; z|C| in the <nite <eld GF(q) and by taking, for any
h=1; : : : ; |C|, the vector (1h;1; : : : ; 1h; ‘)= (1; zh; z2h; : : : ; z‘−1h ).
These linear forms can be used to de<ne a linear key generator K. More pre-
cisely, conference keys are determined as follows: for every conference Ch ∈C, a vec-
tor v∈GF(q)‘ is chosen uniformly at random and %h=’h(v). The former assumption
of independence of any sequence of ‘ forms implies that any set of ‘ − 1 conference
keys does not provide any information on the value of any other conference keys.
Finally, for any vector space U over GF(q), the linear key generator K, which
provides conference keys belonging to the <nite <eld GF(q), can be extended to a linear
key generator KU , whose keys %h are vectors in U . To this aim, the linear mappings
’Uh :U
‘→U can be de<ned by ’Uh (u1; : : : ; u‘)=
∑‘
j=1 1h; juj, where (1h;1; : : : ; 1h; ‘) are
the coordinates of the linear form ’h. It is not diDcult to see that, as before, any ‘
diCerent conference keys are independent.
At this point we have all the tools to set up, from given LSSS  and linear key
generator K, an (A;C;G)-DKDS. More precisely, given  and K, we can construct
‘ by means of the Cartesian product as de<ned above, the linear key generator KE
and, for any i=0; 1; : : : ; n, the linear key generator Ki =KEi , de<ned by the linear
mappings ’ih=’
Ei
h . These choices imply that, for any i=0; 1; : : : ; n and Ch ∈C, we
have that ’ih ◦ ‘i = i ◦ ’Eh . Indeed, for any u=(u1; : : : ; u‘)∈E‘,
(’ih ◦ ‘i )(u) =’ih(i(u1); : : : ; i(u‘)) =
‘∑
j=1
1h;ji(uj)
= i
(
‘∑
j=1
1h;juj
)
= (i ◦ ’Eh )(u):
The above relation is the key point in order to understand the construction and, more
precisely, the key computation phase performed by the users. The full protocol can be
described as follows:
Initialisation phase
Let PI = {S1; : : : ; St} be the authorised subset of servers PI ∈A performing the initialisation phase.
• For every i=1; : : : ; t, the server Si chooses at random a vector ri ∈E‘ and, for every j=
1; : : : ; n, sends to server Sj the vector ‘j (ri)∈E‘j .
• For j=1; : : : ; n, each server Sj computes his private information summing up the shares it
has received from the servers in PI . That is, server Sj computes aj = ‘j (r1) + · · ·
+ ‘j (rt)= 
‘
j (u)∈E‘j , where u= r1 + · · · + rt ∈E‘.
Therefore, after the initialisation phase, each server Si has a vector ai =(ai1; : : : ; ai‘)∈
E‘i . This vector is a share of a secret vector 
‘
0(u)= v=(v1; : : : ; v‘)∈E‘0 shared
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according to the LSSS ‘. The key corresponding to the conference Ch ∈C is %h=
(’0h ◦ ‘0)(u)∈E0.
The key request phase is carried out as follows:
Key request phase
• A user in a conference Ch who wants to obtain the conference key %h sends a key-request message
for the conference key to an authorised subset of servers A= {Si1 ; : : : ; Sir}∈A.
• Each server Si invoked by the user checks that the user belongs to Ch and sends the user the
vector ’ih(ai)= (’
i
h ◦ ‘i )(u)= (i ◦ ’Eh )(u)∈Ei , which is a share of the conference key %h = (’0h ◦
‘0)(u)= (0 ◦ ’Eh )(u)∈E0 shared according to the LSSS .
Finally, recovering the conference key requires a simple computation.
Key computation phase
• Using the values received from the servers in A∈A the user in Ch recovers the secret key by
computing %h = A(’
i1
h (ai1 ); : : : ; ’
ir
h (air )).
It is possible to check, by applying the properties of the linear secret-sharing scheme
 and the linear key generator K, that the proposed scheme veri<es conditions 1–4
of De<nition 3.1. Moreover, condition 5 is proved in Section 5.1.
Finally, we compare the parameters of our scheme with the bounds given in
Section 4. Let
 =
dim E0
max16i6n dim Ei
be the information rate of the LSSS . Let q (a power of a prime) be the cardinality
of the <nite <eld GF(q).
The amount of information that a server Si ∈S has to send to a user Uj ∈Ch in the
key request phase is log |Y hi; j|= log |Ei|= log q dim Ei.
Observe that
max
i=1;:::;n
log |Y hi;j| = log q dim E0
maxi=1;:::;n dim Ei
dim E0
=
log |K |
(;A;S)
:
Therefore, the bounds given by Theorems 4.3–4.6 are attained if  has optimal
information rate, that is, if (;A;S)= (A).
Remark. The linearity property of the secret-sharing scheme is not necessary to design
a DKDS. Actually, from any secret-sharing scheme, realising a given access structure,
we can set up a DKDS on the same access structure. The reader can easily con-
vince himself noticing that in our protocol each server sums up the shares obtained
during the distribution phase, storing in this way a reduced amount of information.
This is one of the steps in which the linearity property of the scheme is applied. If the
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secret-sharing scheme is not linear, each server has to store all the shares received from
the servers performing the distribution. On the other hand, when a user asks for a con-
ference key, he receives several shares that must be processed in order to recover the
conference key.
5.1. Security of the scheme
In this subsection we prove that the above construction is secure, that is, we prove
that condition 5 in De<nition 3.1 is veri<ed by the constructed scheme.
Let us consider a coalition F ∪G, where G ∈G is a set of corrupted users and
F ⊂S; F =∈A is a set of corrupted servers. According to De<nition 3.1, the maximum
amount of information the users in G can acquire honestly running the protocol is YHGG .
Furthermore, the servers in F =∈A know (F and, maybe, (Z;N , where N = {1; : : : ; n}
and Z is the set of those servers in F that belongs to the initialisation subset as well.
We have to prove that in this scenario, H (Kh |YHGG ;$F ;$Z;N )=H (Kh). In order to
do it, we will use Lemma 2.2; therefore, we need to determine the linear maps ’0
and ’1 corresponding, respectively, to the random variables Kh and Y
HG
G ;$F ;$Z;N .
Recalling that PI = {S1; : : : ; St}, let us suppose that the set F =∈A of dishonest servers
is F = {S1; : : : ; St−1; Sit ; : : : ; Sim}; then, the set Z is given by {S1; : : : ; St−1}. For every
i=1; : : : ; t, let ri ∈E‘ be the vector chosen by server Si at random, and let r=(r1; : : : ; rt)
∈E‘t be the information the servers in PI generates during the initialisation phase.
The servers in Z = {S1; : : : ; St−1} know r1; : : : ; rt−1. These vectors can be written as
ri = 4i(r) for i=1; : : : ; t − 1, where 4i(r) denotes the ith projection of the vector
r=(r1; : : : ; rt). Moreover dishonest servers Sit ; : : : ; Sim not belonging to PI also know
5
the information received from the honest server St in the initialisation phase, i.e. server
Sij receives 
‘
ij (rt)= 
‘
ij (4t(r)) for j= t; : : : ; m. On the other hand, the information that
users in G can acquire is determined by 5j(r1; : : : ; rt)=’0j ◦ ‘0(r1 + · · ·+ rt) for those
j∈HG. Therefore, the kernel of the linear map ’1 associated with the random vari-
ables YHGG ;$F ;$Z;N is
ker ’1 =
(
t−1⋂
j=1
ker 4j
)
∩
(
m⋂
j=t
ker ‘ij
)
∩
( ⋂
j∈HG
ker 5j
)
:
Since every key %h is de<ned by %h=5h(r1; : : : ; rt)=’0h ◦‘0(r1+ · · ·+rt), the kernel
of the linear map ’0 related to the random variable Kh is
ker ’0 = ker 5h:
Hence, we have to show that
ker ’0 + ker ’1 = E‘t :
5 Notice that we do not take into account the information that servers Sit ; : : : ; Sim receive from servers in
Z because it can be deduced from r1; : : : ; rt−1 and these values are known by the members of the coalition.
286 C. Blundo et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 320 (2004) 269–291
Trivially ker ’0 + ker ’1⊂E‘t . The opposite inclusion E‘t ⊂ ker ’0 + ker ’1 can be
shown as follows: let y=(y1; : : : ; y‘) be any vector in E‘. The independence of the
mappings {5j}j∈HG , implies that
ker ’0h +
( ⋂
j∈HG
ker ’0j
)
= E‘0 :
Therefore, ‘0(y)= (0(y1); : : : ; 0(y‘))= (a1; : : : ; a‘) + (b1; : : : ; b‘) where 5j(a1; : : : ;
a‘)= 0 for any j∈HG and 5h(b1; : : : ; b‘)= 0. Since F =∈A, from the properties of
the LSSS, it holds that for any j=1; : : : ; ‘ there exists a zj ∈E such that 0(zj)= aj
and i(zj)= 0 for any Si ∈F .
Hence, setting w= y−z∈E‘, where z=(z1 : : : ; z‘), it is easy to check that 5h(‘0(y−
z))=5h(b1; : : : ; b‘)= 0. Let x=(x1; : : : ; xt) be a vector in E‘t . We can prove that
x∈ ker ’0 + ker ’1. To this aim, let us de<ne y= xt +
∑t−1
i=1 x
i ∈E‘. From the afore-
mentioned results, there exists a vector z such that 5h(‘0(y−z))= 0, ‘j (z)= 0 for every
Sj ∈F , and 5j(z)= 0 for every j∈HG. Further, by de<ning vectors u=(x1; : : : ; xt−1;
y − z −∑t−1i=1 xi) and v=(0; 0; : : : ; 0; z)∈E‘t , it follows that x= u + v∈E‘t . At this
point, it is not diDcult to show that u∈ ker ’0 and v∈ ker ’1, which closes the proof.
Indeed, ’0(v)=’0h ◦ ‘0(x1; : : : ; xt−1; y− z−
∑t−1
i=1 x
i)=’0h ◦ ‘0(y− x)= 0 and, on the
other hand, 4j(v)= 0 for every j=1; : : : ; t − 1. Moreover, ‘ij (4t(v))= ‘ij (z)= 0 for
every j= t; : : : ; m and, <nally, 5j(v)=’0j ◦ ‘0(z)= 0 for every j∈HG. Therefore, the
result holds.
6. Some examples
We present some examples to explain how the construction given in the previous
section to set up a DKDS can be really applied given an arbitrary access structure
on the set of servers. Basically, we need simply to re-phrase in the “language” of the
LSSSs to some well-known constructions of secret-sharing schemes for general access
structures, such as the monotone circuit technique of Benaloh and Leichter [4] and the
Brickell vector space construction for ideal access structures. Then, the design of a
DKDS easily follows.
The Benaloh and Leichter monotone circuit technique for secret-sharing schemes
works as follows: let A be an access structure on the set of servers S= {S1; : : : ; Sn},
and let A0 be the basis of A. Moreover, let X1 +X2 + · · ·+Xr be a disjunctive normal
form boolean formula representing A0. Each subset in A0 corresponds to a clause Xi
of the formula. For instance, a (2; 3) threshold access structure on the set {S1; S2; S3},
can be represented by S1S2 + S2S3 + S1S3. Moreover, let di be the number of minimal
subsets in which server Si belongs to. The value di quanti<es the number of shares Si is
going to receive. For i=1; : : : ; n, let Ei be a vector space of dimension di over a <nite
<eld GF(q), let E0 =GF(q) and let E be a vector space of dimension 1+
∑r
i=1 (|Xi|−
1). A vector v∈E, denoted by v=(k; v11; : : : ; v|X1|−11 ; v12; : : : ; v|X2|−12 ; : : : ; v1r ; : : : ; v|Xr |−1r ),
is selected uniformly at random. The secret value is 0(v)= k∈E0 and the linear
C. Blundo et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 320 (2004) 269–291 287
mappings i’s are de<ned in such a way that the set of servers corresponding to the
clause Xi will hold the sharing v1i ; : : : ; v
|Xi|−1
i ; k − (v1i + · · · + v|Xi|−1i ), which allow to
recover the secret k.
As a second example, let us suppose that the access structure A is ideal and that
we can use the Brickell vector space construction [12].
That is, we suppose that there exist a d-dimensional vector space U over a <nite <eld
GF(q) and a function 5 :S−→U such that the vector (1; 0; : : : ; 0) can be expressed
as a linear combination of the vectors in the set {5(Si) : Si ∈B} if and only if B is
an authorised subset, i.e. (1; 0; : : : ; 0)∈ 〈5(Si) : Si ∈B〉⇔B∈A. Then, in order to share
a secret k ∈GF(q), the dealer chooses a random vector v∈U whose <rst component
is k and computes {v · 5(Si)}ni=1. In other words, in this case the linear mappings
i :U→GF(q) are de<ned by i(v)= v · 5(Si).
Using a well-studied access structure on a set of four servers, we show that the
bounds are attained every time we can construct an optimal linear secret-sharing scheme
realising the given access structure. To this aim, let us consider the access structure
on a set S= {S1; S2; S3; S4} of four servers whose minimal authorised subsets are
A0 = {{S1; S2}; {S2; S3}; {S3; S4}}. This access structure is well known in the literature
concerning secret-sharing schemes [16].
It has been proved in [16] that the information rate of any SSS for this access
structure is at most 23 . Besides, there exists a linear secret-sharing scheme  with
information rate = 23 . Therefore, we can use this construction in order to design an
(A;C;G)-DKDS attaining the bounds in Section 4. Let us see how this construction
works. Let E0; E1; E4 be vector spaces over a <nite <eld GF(q) of dimension 2, and
let E2 and E3 be three-dimensional vector spaces and E a vector space of dimension
6. Assume that k=(k1; k2)∈E0 is the secret. A pre-image v of the secret is given by
the vector v=(71; 81; !1; 72; 82; !2), where 7i + 8i = ki for i=1; 2. The linear mappings
are de<ned in such a way that the servers receive:
S1 (71; 72 + 82 − !2)
S2 (81; 72; !2)
S3 (71; !1; 82)
S4 (71 + 81 − !1; 72)
Finally, it is interesting to point out that the two constructions presented in [31],
based on bivariate polynomials and on monotone span programs, can be seen as in-
stances of the algebraic framework we have described before. In particular, the embed-
ding of the second construction can be done due to the equivalence between monotone
span programs and linear secret-sharing schemes [1].
7. Conclusion and open problems
In this paper we have shown bounds and constructions for unconditionally secure
DKDSs with a general access structure on the set of servers. Such schemes enable to
setup distributed KDCs which solve many problems related to the presence across a
288 C. Blundo et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 320 (2004) 269–291
network of a single on-line KDC. Two main contributions can be found in this paper:
the reduction technique applied to <nd the lower bounds, and the linear algebraic
framework which uni<es many previous proposals.
Some interesting questions arise from this study: <rst of all, we have considered a
framework in which each user has private connections with all the servers. From a
real-life prospective, it would be useful to study a model in which users have only
some connections with geographically close servers.
Another research direction is to study computationally secure distributed key dis-
tribution schemes along the line of [31], where some constructions based on pseudo-
random functions and the discrete log problem have been proposed.
Finally, for the unconditional and computational frameworks, methods to enhance
the constructions with properties like veri<ability of the servers’ behaviours, proactive
security, and anonymity of the conference keys recovered by the users with respect to
the servers, are all desirable features to work on.
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Appendix A. Information theory elements
This appendix brieNy recalls some elements of information theory (see [18] for
details).
A discrete random experiment is de<ned by a <nite set, called sample space, con-
sisting of all elementary events, and a probability measure assigning a non-negative
real number to every elementary event, such that the sum of all these probabilities is
equal to 1. An event of a discrete random experiment is a subset of the sample space,
and the probability assigned to it is the sum of the probabilities of its elementary
events.
A discrete random variable X is a mapping from a sample space to a certain range
X , and is characterised by its probability distribution {PX(x)}x∈X that assigns to every
x∈X the probability PX(x) of the event that X takes on the value x.
The entropy of X, denoted by H (X), is a real number that measures the uncertainty
about the value of X when the underlying random experiment is carried out. It is
de<ned by
H (X) = −∑
x:X
PX(x) log PX(x); (A.1)
assuming that the terms of the form 0 log 0 are excluded from the summation, and
where the logarithm is relative to the base 2. The entropy satis<es 06H (X)6 log |X |,
where H (X)= 0 if and only if there exists x0 ∈X such that Pr(X= x0)= 1; whereas,
H (X)= log |X | if and only if Pr(X= x)= 1=|X |, for all x∈X . The deviation of the
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entropy H (X) from its maximal value can be used as a measure of non-uniformity of
the distribution {PX(x)}x∈X .
Given two random variables X and Y, taking values on sets X and Y , respectively,
according to a probability distribution {PXY(x; y)}x∈X;y∈Y on their Cartesian product,
the conditional uncertainty of X, given the random variable Y, called conditional
entropy and denoted by H (X |Y), is de<ned as
H (X |Y) = − ∑
y∈Y
∑
x∈X
PY(y)PX |Y(x |y) log PX |Y(x |y): (A.2)
Notice that the conditional entropy is not the entropy of a probability distribution
but the average over all entropy H (X |Y=y). Simple algebra shows that
H (X |Y)¿ 0 (A.3)
with equality if and only if X is a function of Y . Given n + 1 random variables,
X1; : : : ;Xn;Y, the entropy of X1; : : : ;Xn given Y can be written as
H (X1; : : : ;Xn |Y) = H (X1 |Y) + H (X2 |X1;Y) + · · ·+ H (Xn |X1; : : : ;Xn−1;Y):
(A.4)
The mutual information between X and Y is given by
I(X;Y) = H (X)− H (X |Y):
Since, I(X;Y)= I(Y;X) and I(X;Y)¿0; it is easy to see that
H (X)¿ H (X |Y); (A.5)
with equality if and only if X and Y are independent. Therefore, given n random
variables, X1; : : : ;Xn, it holds that
H (X1; : : : ;Xn)6
n∑
i=1
H (Xi); (A.6)
where the equality holds if X1; : : : ; Xn are mutually independent.
Given three random variables, X, Y, and Z, the conditional mutual information
between X and Y given Z can be written as
I(X;Y |Z) =H (X |Z)− H (X |Z;Y) = H (Y |Z)− H (Y |Z;X)
= I(Y;X |Z): (A.7)
Finally, given 2n random variables X1; : : : ;Xn;Y1; : : : ;Yn; it holds that
H (X1; : : : ;Xn |Y1; : : : ;Yn)6
n∑
i=1
H (Xi |Yi): (A.8)
The following simple lemma establishes that, given three random variables A, B,
and C, if B is a function of C, then B gives less information on A than C.
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Lemma A.1. Let A, B, and C be three random variables such that H (B |C)= 0.
Then, H (A |B)¿H (A |C).
Proof. Notice that, (A.3) and (A.5) imply
06 H (B |A;C)6 H (B |C) = 0:
Since from (A.7)
I(A;B |C) =H (A |C)− H (A |B;C)
=H (B |C)− H (B |A;C) = 0;
then, H (A |C)=H (A |B;C). But (A.5) implies H (A |B)¿H (A |B;C). Therefore,
H (A |B)¿H (A |C), which proves the lemma.
Given any four random variables A, B, C, and D, if H (B |C)= 0, then, along the
lines of the above proof, we can show that
H (A |B;D)¿ H (A |C;D): (A.9)
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